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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utab 
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of 
the Estate of WENDELL 0. JORG-
ENSEN, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7338 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF F.A!CTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
Where the italics are ours it is so indicated. 
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, (45 U. S.C. A., Sec. 51, et seq.), hereinafter 
referred to as the F. E. L. A., by the administrator of the 
estate of Wendell 0. Jorgensen to recover for the alleged 
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wrongful death of Jorgensen occurring in the course of his 
employment with the defendant company as a brakeman. 
The case has been tried twice. At the first trial, the 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, the jury returned 
a verdict against the plaintiff of "no cause of action" (R. 
132). Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 136), 
which the court granted (R. 178), and in connection with 
the granting of said motion filed a written memorandum of 
decision ( R. 179) . The case was retried, the Honorable J. 
Allan Crockett presiding, and resulted in a verdict and 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $75,000.00 (R. 260). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds, 
among others, of excessive damages. The court made an 
order granting said motion unless plaintiff consented within 
ten days to a reduction in the judgment to $50,000.00 (R. 
284), and denying defendant's motion for a new trial in 
the event plaintiff consented to such remittitur. Plaintiff 
filed its written consent to reduction of said judgment to 
$50,000.00 (R.. 286). Thereafter the defendant timely 
served and filed its notice of appeal (R. 301) from said 
judgment, setting forth therein that it did not intend to 
assign error as to any proceedings in the second trial but 
intended only to assign as error the order of the Honorable 
Clarence E. Baker in granting plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial following the first trial of said action. Plaintiff 
thereupon sought to cross-appeal assigning as error the 
action of the Honorable J. Allan Crockett following the 
second trial in requiring a remittitur by plaintiff as a 
condition to denying defendant's motion for a new trial 
(R. 307A). This cross-appeal, after a hearing, was dis· 
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missed by this court on June 1, 1949. This appeal seeks 
a review of the action of the Honorable Clarence E. Baker 
in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial after the 
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the defendant of 
uno cause of action." The nature of the sole assignment of 
error herein made requires a comprehensive statement of 
the facts. 
THE FACTS 
The defendant maintains a branch line of railroad that 
runs generally north and south, paralleling the main line 
between Idaho Falls on the north and Goshen Junction on 
the south. This branch line lies east of the main line and 
is known as the Goshen Branch. The stations thereon, 
!:: moving from Idaho Falls south, are : Orvin, Lincoln, Lincoln 
Junction, Wilkinson, Ammon, Hackman, Indian, Gerrard, 
Cox, Goshen, Anton and Goshen Junction, a distance of 
27.7 miles (Defendant's Ex. 3; R. 22). Operations on this 
line are seasonal and involve the setting out of empty cars 
at the above named stations and picking them up and re-
turning them to Idaho Falls or Lincoln when they are 
loaded. The traffic is principally in beets, some potatoes, 
and pumice stone which is picked up at one station, Indian, 
and the operation is referred to as the Lincoln beet job. 
The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company maintains a factory at 
Lincoln. The job was set up September 22, 1947 and traffic 
such as indicated above was handled until January 10, 1948, 
at which time the service was discontinued. It is a daily 
operation, including Sundays, once it starts and the de-
ceased had worked every day from the time the job was 
set up, September 22, 1947, until the day of the accident. 
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Customarily, and on the day of the accident, the crew works 
doing switching between Idaho Falls and Lincoln and at 
Orvin, which is between these two stations, in the morn-
ing. It was the custom, as on the day in question, for the 
crew to return to Idaho Falls for their noonday meal and 
in the afternoon proceed south as far along the branch 
line toward Goshen Junction as was necessary to take care 
of the business of setting out empties at the various sta-
tipns where needed and picking up such loads of beets, 
potatoes, and pumice stone as were to be moved. The train 
was in "work train service" and operated out of Idaho Falls 
under a "work order." There are no station agents at any 
of the stations south of Lincoln Junction and the uwork 
order" referred to authorized the crew to proceed along this 
line at will doing whatever work was necessary. The train 
involved at the moment of the accident consisted of a steam 
locomotive, headed south-the direction in which the move-
ment was being made-ahead of which was being shoved a 
caboose, with ten empty gondolas trailing behind the engine. 
The crew consisted of Edward J. Freeman, conductor; 
James S. Stoddard, engineer ; a fireman by the name of 
Eaton, whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of the 
trial and who did not testify; Paul Croft, rear brakeman; 
and the deceased Jorgensen, head brakeman. The deceased 
as head brakeman was riding on the leading platform of the 
caboose together with Paul Croft the other brakeman as 
the train proceeded south from Ammon. It was a nice day, 
the caboose door was closed, and Conductor Freeman was 
inside the caboose working at his desk. Approximately one-
half mile south of Ammon, at about 2 :'50 p. m., while the 
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train was traveling from 15 to 20 miles an hour, deceased 
fell from the caboose platform in front of the moving equip-
ment and was killed instantly. The defendant admitted 
that it and the deceased were mutually engaged in inter-
state commerce by rail as employer and employe at the time 
of the accident. 
In the instructions four specific allegations of negli-
gence were submitted to the jury, the substance thereof 
being as follows : 
I. That the defendant failed to furnish decedent 
a reasonably safe place to work when it required 
him to perform his duties from the platform of 
the caboose. 
IT. That the defendant was negligent in failing to 
furnish and maintain a proper safety chain and 
hook across the opening in the railing on the 
end of the caboose. 
Ill. That the defendant was negligent in shoving 
the caboose ahead of the engine. 
IV. That the defendant failed to furnish decedent 
a safe place to work in that the caboose, owing 
to its size, weight and construction, swayed 
from side to side and pitched up and down 
when being shoved along the tracks at the point 
of the accident. 
(R. 103.) 
The defendant denied its negligence in each and all 
of the foregoing particulars, charged the deceased with 
contributory negligence, and charged the deceased with 
negligence that was the sole proximate cause of the ac-
cident (R. 32-36; 105). 
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All of the evidence bearing on each of the issues set 
out above is segregated and presented in connection with 
the issue to which it is pertinent, although there is of 
necessity some overlapping; minor portions of the evidence 
having pertinency to more than one issue. The above gen-
eral statement is supported by the detailed reference to 
the record hereinafter made. 
ISSUE NO. I 
THAT THE DE·FENDANT FAILED TO FURNISH 
DECEDENT A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE TO 
WORK WHEN IT REQUIRED HIM TO PERFORM 
HIS DUTIES FROM THE PLATFORM OF THE 
CABOOSE. 
According to Paul Croft, who was riding the caboose 
platform with Jorgensen at the time of the accident, it 
was customary for both the head and rear brakemen to 
take positions on the platform as the train moved along 
to Goshen Junction ( R. 27, 28) ; that the brakemen had 
the duty of looking out ahead for livestock that might be 
along the right of way and for vehicular traffic that might 
be at or near crossings (R. 42); that there was on the end 
of the caboose and where either of the brakemen could 
operate it what is known as a tail hose which carried the 
air in the train line and had a valve by which one of the 
brakemen could set the air stopping the train, if necessitated, 
and also enabled the brakemen to operate a whistle. At the 
time of the accident Jorgensen was standing on the caboose 
platform six inches or a foot behind the safety chain, with 
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his left hand on the fourth rung from the bottom of the 
ladder which runs from the platform to the top of the 
caboose (R. 40; see Plaintiff's Exs. C, D, and I). The 
platform of the caboose was thirty inches in width from 
the end wall of the caboose to the railing on the end of the 
caboose and was six feet three inches from side to side, in 
good condition, without defects of any kind. Jorgensen's 
duties also involved, as did the duties of all the train crew, 
inspection of the train as it moved, which inspection from 
the leading platform of the caboose would require his lean-
ing out from the left or right hand side of the platform 
(R. 396). At the time of the accident he had no duties to 
perform and was performing no duty except riding and 
looking forward (R. 61). 
The conductor, Edward James Freeman, testified that 
it was not necessary for the brakemen to be on the platform 
of the caboose to perform their duties as there was an 
emergency valve inside the caboose (R. 341, 342), and, as 
the exhibits show the caboose had windows in the end wall, 
the track ahead could have been observed from inside the 
caboose. Moreover, the engineer, James S. Stoddard, had 
an unobstructed view straight ahead and was able to look 
forward along the track and would have been able to do 
so from the front window of the cab, although at the time 
of the accident it was a nice day and he was leaning out 
of the cab and having no difficulty in seeing all crossings 
(R. 427). He was whistling for all crossings on this oc-
casion; he did so regardless of whether some brakeman on 
the caboose platform whistled, and considered it one of his 
duties at the time and place to watch for crossings and 
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whistle for them (R. 428). Conductor Freeman testified. 
that it was not unusual for Croft and Jorgensen to be on 
the caboose platform a~d it was, in fact, the usual, custom-
ary thing and the proper place for them to be. At the time 
of the accident Croft was standing on the right-hand side of 
the caboose platform, facing fo!ward, with one hand hold-
ing a grab-iron which is fastened to the end wall of the 
caboose. Jorgensen and Croft went to work when this job 
started, September 22, 19'47, and both had ridden this 
caboose platform every day. At the time of the accident 
the caboose was traveling, according to Groft, at approxi-
mately 20 miles an hour ( R. 57) , and on cross-examination 
he placed the speed at from 15 to 20 miles per hour, which 
he testified was not an unusual speed on this track at the 
point of the accident (R. 109). That the grabirons on each 
side of the end wall of the caboose are to aid in getting 
on and off and to hold on to while riding (R. 112). Croft 
further testified that he was holding on more out of habit 
than because of the riding qualities of the caboose (R. 115). 
That he was talking just "ordinary talk" and turned his 
head and was looking out to the side when he heard a com-
motion, turned his head back, and could see Brakeman 
Jorgensen halfway between the caboose and the ground; 
that Jorgensen fell face forward with his hands out in 
front of him and it looked to Croft like he lit on his hands 
and feet. He fell inside the rails toward the left. That the 
noise he heard sounded like metal coming against metal 
(R. 57, 58) ; that he immediately crossed over to the air 
valve and pulled the air, bringing the train to a stop within 
160 to 200 feet (R. 58, 59). Croft was unable to say where 
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Jorgensen's right hand was or what he was doing with it 
(R. 112). Before the accident and while Croft and Jorgen-
sen were on the platform the safety chain was across the 
opening and in position (R. 58). That Jorgensen had, just 
prior to the accident, sounded a whistle for a crossing and 
that it was approximately one-quarter or one-half mile to 
the next crossing (R. 61); that he had no duties to perform 
before they came to the next crossing except to watch for 
livestock or. anything that might obstruct the movement of 
the train (R. 61); that the fireman's duty, as well as the 
engineer's, was to keep a lookout ahead on his side of the 
engine (R. 129); that the engineer was whistling for all 
crossings ( R. 128) ; that Jorgensen was not inspecting the 
train at the time of the accident, nor was the witness, and 
that Jorgensen's duty of inspecting had nothing to do with 
the accident (R. 13,3); that he heard no outcry of any kind 
when Jorgensen fell (R. 134); that Jorgensen could have 
stood any place on the platform, either to the left or the 
right side or behind the ladder, in the performance of his 
duties. 
Conductor Freeman testified that after the accident 
he examined the platform, the chain, and the hook and that 
there was nothing about the platform that could have caused 
or contributed to Jorgensen's falling (R. 333). 
ISSUE NO. II 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN 
-- FAILING TO FURNISH AND MAINTAIN A 
PROPER SAFETY eHAIN AND HOOK ACROSS 
THE OPENING IN THE RAILING ON THE END 
OF THE CABOOSE. 
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The safety chain which was attached to the caboose at 
the time of the accident was received in evidence as de- j]r 
fendant's Exhibit No. 1. It was removed from the caboose ::r i 
the day after the accident at the direction of defendant's ~~ 
witness Melvin E. Hurd and its custody accounted for until ~; tl 
it was offered in evidence. The bracket or eye into which li1!Ucl 
the hook fitted when the chain was up was welded to the 
side of the ladder and would have necessitated the use of 
a cutting torch to remove. Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 is a 
bracket or eye which was made and is the same size and :~~1DI 
dimensions as the one which was attached to the caboose .::Jnl 
at the time of the accident (R. 308, 309). The witness Croft 
testified that the purpose of the safety chain was to prevent ~:ililn 
anyone from being thrown off the platform by any un- ;: dna 
expected jerk or movement (R. 50); that when they left "':it\ 
Idaho Falls the chain was in place and hooked (R. 51) and 
was hooked and in place immediately before Jorgensen fell 
(R. 58); that the chain had a shorter hook than an ordinary 
chain but owing to its length was tighter than an ordinary 
chain when hooked (R. 51, 52, 129). 
Fenton Wilson, a witness called by the plaintiff and 
brother-in-law of the deceased, testified that he went to 
the scene of the accident immediately afterwards and ex~ 
amined the chain and that by pushing down on the chain it 
would come up and out and if hit from beneath it would 
become disengaged ( R. 202) ; that the chain was tighter 
when hooked, however,. than some chains the witness had 
seen (R. 206); that the chain in question was not the 
ordinary chain but that the chain introduced as plaintiff's 
Exhibit G was (R. 206). 
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A. L. Say, Mechanical Foreman at Idaho Falls, who 
took the chain off the caboose after the accident and marked 
it for identification with three chisel marks (R. 305), 
testified that there was no such thing as a regulation safety 
chain; that safety chains are not covered, nor are their 
construction and specifications called for in the Safety 
Appliance Act and that there is no standard chain, the 
same being handmade. That he installed another chain 
on the caboose to take the place of the one removed for use 
in evidence and such chain was approximately the same 
as the one removed. That the chains are not stamped out 
on a machine but are made on a blacksmith's forge (R .. 299). 
That there is no regulation size hook for a caboose safety 
chain and that they may be made in any dimensions the 
railroad company sees fit, and that the hook on the chain 
in question (Defendant's Exhibit 1) resembled the ordinary 
hook used (R. 300). 
Leo A. Williams, a witness for the plaintiff and 
Mortician and County Coroner at Idaho Falls, was called 
to the scene of the accident at about 3:15 p. m. (R. 187, 
188). He testified that he examined the safety chain "very 
closely," was accompanied at the time by the Sheriff of 
the County and one of his deputies, and that he examined 
the hook for the purpose of determining the manner in 
which it could be hooked and unhooked (R. 188, 192); that 
affixed as it was to the caboose it was not difficult to re-
move with a simple twist of the hand but that it required 
a slight reverse and upward motion of the hand to dis-
engage the hook from the eye (R. 184); that the hook had 
to be raised in a vertical position and when hooked it was 
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necessary to take hold of the hook itself and raise it in a r~t 
vertical position to unhook it (R. 195, 196); that it was fir~ 
possible for the hook to rest on the bracket iron and not be ;1w1: 
engaged in the eye or hooked but in such a position tha.t a 
movement of the chain would jar it off; that some pressure 
or force against the chain would dislodge it but only when 
the hook was resting on top of the bracket and was not 
completely hooked (R. 19'7). 
Conductor Edward James Freeman testified that in 
his opinion the hook on the safety chain was a good and 
substantial hook and that it would have to be taken out, 
that is, "unlatched" in some way to become disengaged 
(R. 332). 
Plaintiff's witness Croft testified that he did not think 
the chain in question (Defendant's Ex. 1) was a proper 
chain; that the hook was too small; and that he did think 
plaintiff's Exhibit G was an ordinary standard safety 
chain (R. 162, 163). He admitted on cross-examination 
that he had told Melvin E. Hurd, Claim Agent, that Jorgen-
sen "was closer to the center of the caboose near the safety 
chain, which was a good strong chain equipped with good 
hook, so that he was able to hold on to the steep upright Th~iig 
«~(; part of the ladder with his left hand" (R. 141-145). 
ISSUE NO. III :r~~~ it 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ::~~l(: 
SHOVING THE CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE t:itisl 
~iVIikhl ENGINE. 
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Two operating rules having a bearing upon this issue 
were read in evidence: Rule 802 (J), which reads as 
~~ follows: 
1.:., 
..... 
• .J.-
"Cars must not be handled ahead of engines 
between stations, except when necessary to take 
cars to or from a spur or in work train seTVice, and 
the movement then must be for no greater distance 
than necessary." 
(R. 46.) 
And Rule 802 (H), providing: 
"Running switches must not be made when 
practicable to avoid doing so, and must not be made 
over spring switches, in interlocking limits, with 
ears containing explosives or inflammables, nor 
when such movement might cause personal injury, 
or damage to equipment or contents of cars. 
"Before making a running switch, all members 
of the crew must understand the movement to be 
made; hand brakes and switches to be used must be 
tested; there must be a trainman or yardman at the 
brake, if necessary, and the engine must be run on 
straight track when practicable." 
(R. 131.) 
The significance of the above rules lies in the fact that 
:=: Rule 802 (J) implies some danger in pushing cars ahead 
~~·:. of an engine and prohibits the same, except where it is 
necessary to do so in order to take cars to or from a spur 
or where it is being done in "work train service"; while 
Rule 802 (H) prohibits the making of running switches 
' when it is practicable to avoid doing so and prohibits run-
.. · ning switches entirely under some circumstances. The run-
ning switch is throughout the record referred to as a "drop" 
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and is sometimes known as a "flying switch." It may be 
excusable for us to at this time indicate the significance of 
the testimony under the issue now being discussed, the 
plaintiff on the one hand seeking to prove the defendant 
negligent by reason of the fact that it was at the time of 
the accident permitting a caboose to be shoved ahead of 
the engine, and the defendant on the other hand claiming 
that such movement was permissible and within the ex-
ception of Rule 802 (J), due to the fact that it was necessary 
to take cars to and from spurs on the Lincoln beet job, and 
the train was actually in "work train service," both being 
exceptions provided for in the rule. The defendant's posi-
tion further being that the operation on the Goshen Branch 
required either the shoving of the caboose ahead of the 
engine, which was permissible under Rule 802 (J) in "work 
train service," or the performing of a more dangerous oper-
ation-the making of a running switch or drop, which is 
prohibited by Rule 802 (H) wherever it is practicable to 
avoid it. 
At the stations of Wilkinson, Ammon and Cox on the 
Goshen Branch there were spur tracks, the one at Wilkin-
son holding three cars, the one at Ammon twenty-five cars, 
and the one at Cox eight cars. There was also a spur at 
Orvin, which is between Idaho Falls and Lincoln. At the 
other stations there were sidings, that is, tracks connected 
with the main line by switches at both ends and which 
might be entered from either the north or the south with 
equipment. The spurs mentioned were of course dead end 
tracks and they ran from north to south, that is, they could 
only be entered by equipment as it moved from north to 
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south (R. 13). In working these spurs it was either neces-
sary to shove the caboose ahead of the engine or to make 
a running switch or drop (R. 13). The station of Cox, at 
which is located a spur, is south of the point of the accident 
and south of Indian where the ten empty gondolas were to 
be set out on the day in question (Defendant's Ex. 3). Con-
ductor Freeman testified that the crew does not know when 
the train is made up at Idaho Falls whether there would be 
any loaded cars ready to be taken off the spur at Cox, for 
instance, or not (R. 416). The train on the day in question 
had been made up by the yard force at Idaho Falls, which 
was customary, and consisted of the caboose ahead of the 
engine, ten empties immediately behind the engine, and 
sixteen cars of beets behind the empties destined for the 
sugar beet factory (R. 25). Eight cars of beets were set 
out at Orvin and eight cars at Lincoln. At the time of the 
accident the equipment consisted of the caboose ahead of 
the engine and the ten empty gondolas trailing. The ten 
empties were destined for Indian, which is a siding, and 
of course the crew knew when they left Idaho Falls that 
they would have to set these cars out at that place (R. 27). 
Their orders for the afternoon of October 28, 1947 were 
to work between Idaho Falls and Goshen Junction (R. 24). 
They did not have any switching to perform at Wilkinson, 
the first station below Lincoln Junction, nor at Ammon, 
nor at Hackman (R. 25). There are no agents at any of the 
t' stations below Lincoln, including the station of Cox, and 
there is no way for the crew to tell whether or not cars 
previously left on spurs such as at Cox are loaded and 
(' ready to be taken out until they arrive at the station (R. 
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3124). The Lincoln beet job is simply a traveling switching 
operation which goes down the branch line and picks up and 
sets out cars when it is necessary to do so (R. 324). Con-
ductor Freeman testified that on the day in question he 
did not know whether he had any work to do at Cox or not; 
that his intentions were to go beyond Indian to Cox and he 
would have gone down to Cox if it had not been for the 
accident (R. 337, 338) ; that owing to the fact that he did 
not know what switching would be necessitated the caboose 
was placed on the front to avoid the necessity of making a 
11(K 
"drop," which he considered more dangerous than shoving I 
~rom 
the caboose ahead of the engine (R. 340); that he did not 
~mo~1 know whether there would be cars on the spur at Cox to be 
taken out or not when he left Idaho Falls to make the run 
(R. 416). That he had worked the Lincoln beet job anum-
ber of years (R. 3.24), and the work had always been per-
formed by shoving the caboose ahead of the engine (R. 328); 
that this was the more practical way, eliminating a lot of 
switching movement, and was the proper method of opera-
tion (R. 329'); that cars are required to be dropped on this 
operation unless the caboose is in front (R. 336) and he 
considered it safer to have the caboose in front than to 
make drops (R. 337-340). That if it had been necessary 
to take cars off the spur at Cox it would have been neces-
sary to make a drop if they had had the caboose behind the ~~rric 
engine (R. 413). That a "drop" is a hazardous operation at '1~ 1Dl 
any time (R. 394). 
I ~IV 
J. E. Brown, a witness for the plaintiff who knew ~OO!hl 
nothing about this accident, and was employed by the D. ~lya1 
& R. G. W. Railroad Company (R. 250) and was called i;lnat 
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simply to answer hypothetical questions, stated that on 
"work trains" cars are sometimes run ahead of the engine 
and sometimes cabooses are run ahead of the engine (R. 
260); t}lat he has seen cabooses pushed ahead of the engine 
many times and that that is the usual thing in the per-
formance of some kinds of work. 
The engineer, James S. Stoddard, with·31 years exper-
ience, testified that ~e had worked steadily on the Lincoln 
beet job from September 22, 194 7 until the day of the ac-
cident (R. 420) ; that it was a violation of the operating 
rules to make a drop where it could be avoided (R. 428); 
that dropping was considered dangerous and considered 
more dangerous than shoving the caboose ahead of the 
engine (R. 419); that Rule 802 (H) against making drops 
is considered by railroad men to mean that dropping cars 
or making running or flying switches should not be done 
unless absolutely necessary (R. 434); that owing to the 
spurs on the Goshen Branch it was necessary to have the 
caboose ahead of the engine to avoid drops (R. 438). That 
on the occasion in question the caboose was not moved 
ahead any greater distance than was necessary and as pro-
vided in Rule 802 (J) (R. 439, 440). That the train in 
question was known as a "work extra" and was in "work 
train service" as mentioned in Rule 802 (J), permitting the 
caboose to be shoved ahead of the engine (R. 438). 
The witness H. G. Baker, called by the defendant, 
testified that he had 38 years of service with the defendant 
company and was at present Trainmaster at Pocatello (R. 
442) ; that he had general direction over train and engine 
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men and direction of train movements (R. 442), and had 
supervision over the Goshen Branch on October 28, 1947 
(R. 461). That the Lincoln beet job operated on a "work 
order" and was in "work train service" within the meaning 
of Rule 802 (J) (R. 443); that a train operating under 
work orders came within the exception of Rule 802 (J) 
permitting the caboose to be shoved ahead of the engine 
(R. 443, 444) ; that the terms "work train order" and "work 
train service" are in railroad operations used interchange-
ably (R. 478) ; that a "work train order" such as the train 
in question was operating under on the date of the accident 
does not indicate the freight or cars to be picked up or the 
switching to be done, but is simply authority to operate over 
a given stretch of railroad (R. 489) ; that the practice on 
the Union Pacific was to shove cabooses ahead of engines 
on branch lines generally in "work train service," that is, 
where a train was assigned to handle any work that might 
originate in the district, such as handling beets on the 
Lincoln beet job (R. 463). 
Plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified on cross-ex-
amination that the train was a "work extra" and that it 
worked at will over the entire Goshen Branch (R. 68, 69); 
that drops are prohibited by Rule 802 (J) unless absolutely 
necessary (R. 80) ; that if switching had beennecessary at 
Cox it would have been necessary to have the caboose ahead 
of the engine or make a drop, or shove back one mile to the 
station of Gerrard (R. 89-93) ; that if they had had to make 
a drop at Cox that would be considered hazardous (R. 94); 
that it would be wrong to drop- cars on this job (H. 95, 96) ; 
that they did not know whether they would have to drop cars 
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or not on this trip and that was the reason the caboose was 
shoved ahead of the engine ( R. 96, 97) . He also testified 
that the usual method of doing the work on the Goshen 
Branch was by dropping cars (R. 153) ; that they dropped 
cars every day he worked on the job (R. 157) ; that if the 
caboose had been in the rear no extra switching would have 
been necessitated (R. 158) ; that he did not know they were 
going to Cox the day of the accident (R. 158) ; that there 
is greater danger in riding the platform of a caboose than 
in making a drop (R. 159) ; that all the orders the crew 
had on the day in question were the orders procured at Idaho 
Falls permitting the train to move at will between two 
designated points, viz, Idaho Falls and Goshen Junction, 
and that that was the usual way this particular work train 
operated (R. 177, 178). 
ISSUE NO. IV 
THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FURNISH 
DECEDENT A SAFE PLACE TO WORK IN THAT 
THE CABOOSE, OWING TO ITS SIZE, WEIGHT 
AND· CONSTRUCTION, SWAYED FROM SIDE TO 
SIDE AND PITCHED UP AND DOWN WHEN 
BEING SHOVED ALONG THE TRACKS AT THE 
POINT OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Under this issue both the construction of the caboose 
and the condition of the tracks at and near the point of 
the accident were complained of by plaintiff. As to the 
caboose, there is no dispute in the record but that the 
caboose had been constructed by converting an automobile 
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car. The work had been done at Grand Island, Nebraska, in 
June and July of 1947 (R. 296-303). The caboose was put 
on the Lincoln beet job when it was set up September 22, 
1947 and was used daily until the accident (R. 296). It 
was undisputed that the caboose did not have a cupola and 
the testimony was that some newer types of cabooses are 
constructed without cupolas (R. 3!60). Plaintiff's witness 
Paul Croft testified that the caboose was larger both in 
length and in height than an ordinary caboose (R. 00); 
that he had ridden the caboose since the start of the beet 
job and that it was a rough rider-rougher than an ordinary ~~naa 
caboose (R. 32-35) ; that it would sway from side to side ~: and bounce up and down ( R. 333, 334) ; that the caboose was swaying from side to side and bouncing up and down just 
before the accident (R. 57) ; that it swayed so badly that 
it would throw one out of a seat and that one riding in the 
caboose had to hold on to everything to get around in the 
car, and that one would be thrown off the platform if he 
did not hold on to something ( R. 117) ; that if one was up 
ahead on the track watching the caboose it swayed so that 
?~lli 
• 
it appeared about to turn over; that the top of the caboose . 1 ~[1)1 
would sway a foot to two feet on each side (R. 118) ; that ~!ii);. 
it would bounce up and down so bad that it would cause a ~~a 
man's feet to leave the floor of the caboose two or three ll~ijj1 
inches (R. 119, 120) ; that the swaying of the ~aboose would l~ian 
not cause a man to be thrown off the front end of the plat- ~~ 1 
form (R. 121, 122) ; that it was safer to stand where the l1 ~1!tlo 
witness was standing than where Jorgensen took up his 
position ('R. 124). This witness further testified that the I Th! ~ 
caboose as a whole was in good condition (R. 130). That ljw~~ 
.!~!~! 
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he did not lose his footing because of the motion of the ca-
boose (R. 137). That the speed at the time of the accident 
was not unusual nor was there any unusual swaying, jerk-
ing or bouncing (R. 147). 
Joseph A. Knox, a witness for the plaintiff, 70 years 
of age, and who had had 45 years experience in train service 
-25 years with the defendant company (R. 23:5), testified 
that he had never ridden a caboose which had been con-
verted from an automobile car and that he had never ridden 
on the Goshen Branch at all ( R. 246) . He further testified 
that he had observed automobile cars many times in motion 
and that they would sway so much as to almost hit cars on 
adjacent tracks; that the top of such cars would sway 
laterally three feet on each side (R. 246'); that he had 
never himself worked on automobile cars (R. 249). 
The witness J. E. Brown, called by the plaintiff, testi-
fied that the platform on the caboose in question was about 
t the same length and width as on an ordinary caboose ( R. 
251); that it was unsafe for men to ride on the platform 
of a caboose (R. 253), because they might get jerked off 
(R. 257) ; that any job on the railroad involving braking 
was hazardous (R. -260); that he did not think the swaying 
would cause a man to be jerked off the platform of a caboose 
if he had hold of something (R. 258, 259); that swaying of 
a caboose would not cause a man to be thrown off the end 
of a platform (R. 259). 
The witness Edward James Freeman, the conductor, 
who was working at his desk inside the caboose at the time 
of the accident testified that it was harder to write in this 
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caboose than in an ordinary caboose; and that this caboose ;t~1 1 
was harder riding than an ordinary caboose ( R. 398) ; that ;~f~ 
it was a good caboose for switching purposes and the job :1~ 
they were on as it had an all-steel underframe (R. 389); ~.~.~~,. 
was a little more rigid than the ordinary caboose (R. 369). .·~" 
That there was no vertical motion of this caboose and that ,:l)ill 
it rode as a usual and ordinary car of this kind rides (R. ~~a] 
401). That there was nothing unusual about the lateral ~~(I 
motion (R. 408). That the caboose was a very good ca-
boose for the job it was being used on (R. 405). 
As to the track, plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified 
that the caboose and train were running along smoothly, 
between 15 and 20 miles per hour, at the time of the ac-
cident (R. 130); that at the point of the accident there :alru 
was not much ballasting, which would have made for a I ~ffi~ 
smoother ride (R. 56) ; that the track was fairly level and f!v~ 
not rough (R. 104), and that there was nothing wrong with ~mli 
the track that would cause the accident (R. 105); that when ·~~ ballasting is done with dirt, as it was on this branch and 
at the point of the accident, it is piled high in the center 
leaving the ends of the ties on each side considerably ex-
posed for drainage purposes (R. 102, 103); that the track 
as shown in plaintiff's Exhibits D, E and F was in the same 
condition as at the time of the accident (R. 53); that so far 
as he knew the track was in good condition (R. 102); that 
there was no unusual swaying, jerking or bouncing at the 
time of the accident ( R. 14 7) . 
Conductor Freeman testified that the speed at the 
time of the accident was about 15 miles per hour (R. 377), 
~~lor. 
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and that it was between 15 and 2{) miles per hour (R. 378); 
that the speed limit at the place of the accident was 2'5 miles 
per hour (R. 378); that at the time of the accident he was 
in the caboose writing and looking over his papers; that the 
caboose was running along smoothly at the time; that there 
were no unusual jerks or jolts of any kind, and that there 
was no application of the air immediately prior to the 
accident ( R. 323) . 
The engineer, James S. Stoddard, testified that at the 
time of the accident they were traveling not to exceed 20 
miles per hour, the train was operating smoothly, the speed 
was uniform, and there was no unusual movement what-
soever (R. 417); that there was no application of the brakes 
by him at any time (R. 418). 
Defendant's witness, Charles C. Heaton, Section Fore-
man for 22 years on the Goshen Branch and having the 
duty of maintaining the track at the point of the accident 
(R. 282, 283), testified that his duty required his covering 
- the territory at the scene of the accident every other day 
(R. 284); that he knew where the accident took place (R. 
285); that it was at a point one-half mile south of Ammon 
by a motor car set-off (R. 293); that he had inspected the 
track at the scene of the accident on October 28, 1947 (R. 
284-287). 
On March 11, 1948 the defendant had motion pictures 
made by a professional motion picture producer simulating 
the movement of the train at the time of the accident. The 
same caboose was shoved ahead of the engine which was 
pulling ten empty gondolas. The engine used was the same 
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class of engine, the track was shown to be in substantially ~uo1 
the same condition, and it was shown that no repairs had ~~~~ 
been made upon the caboose since the time of the accident. ·~.1 
Six runs were made from north to south at speeds of 15, 20, ~1!1 
25, and at between 15 and 20 miles per hour, two runs being ~~ 
made at 20 miles per hour and two runs at between 15 and 20 jilil 
miles per hour. The train was run from north to south at fW~ 
the point of the accident. Trainmaster H. G. Baker rode the ;1~lain 
leading platform of the caboose in the position Jorgensen ~~rtn~ 
was supposed to have been standing. He did not hold on to ~mmd' 
anything (R. 453) and, as the motion pictures (Defend- ~i1Jolii 
ant's Ex. 4) show, he had his hands in his pockets. The 
court admitted the film in evidence and it was run in the 
~~~~ 
~u 
court room by a professional operator of moving picture 1~ ~! 
equipment and was run again in argument by defend- ~!!W l 
ant's counsel. 
~fu 
~~~ 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS GUILTY OF AN ABUSE ~to!: 
OF DISCRETION AND THEREIN ERRED IN 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
:imie! 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW ~~e 
TRIAL. :whlrn 
ARGUMENT ~mot 
The trial court in its decision granting plaintiff's motion , . 1 ~ 
for a new trial stated that it did so "primarily on the grounds ~ttl 
stated in paragraph 8 of plaintiff's notice of intention to ~~ 
move for a new trial, and also upon the general grounds set ~· mn 
1n.A3" wru forth in Section 104-40-7, Utah Code Annotated, i1't 
(R. 17'9-180). Paragraph 8 referred to in plaintiff's notice ~o! 
'~IIOE 
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of intention to move for a new trial was : "That the verdict 
and judgment are contrary to the evidence and against 
law" (R. 137). Section 104-40-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, referred to reads as follows: "The verdict of the jury 
may also be vacated and a new trial granted by the court 
in which the action is pending, on its own motion, without 
the application of either of the parties, when there has been 
such a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the 
court or the evidence in the case as to satisfy the court that 
the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such 
instructions or under the influence of passion and prejudice." 
It thus appears that the trial court's discretion was invoked 
upon the theory that there was a plain disregard of the 
evidence by the jury and a plain disregard of the instruc-
tions such as to convince the court that the verdict was 
rendered under a misapprehension of the instructions or 
under the influence of passion and prejudice. In "its decision 
granting the motion for a new trial the court had this 
further to say: "The jury by its verdict absolved the de-
fendant of all negligence which was a proximate cause of 
· the injuries to and the death of the decedent. It did this 
despite the uncontroverted evidence ( 1) that the caboose 
from which the decedent fell was being propelled ahead of 
the locomotive and of the train, thereby rendering such an 
accident as caused the death of the deceased possible, and 
(2) that the safety chain mentioned in the evi~ence was 
inadequate, at least that when it was put to the test it failed 
to perform the function for which it was intended." * * * 
"There was no doubt a misapprehension, or a disregard, on 
the part of the jury either~ the evidence, or of the court's 
instructions, or of both." (R. 179, 180.) 
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In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. (2d) 176, :~~ 
this court said : 
"In order to eliminate speculation as to the basis 
of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting new 
trials, the record should show the reasons and make ··.: .. 
it clear the court is not invading the province of the 
jury. The trial court should indicate wherein there 
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions 
of the court or the evidence or what constituted bias 
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no reasons 
need be given the province of the jury may be in-
vaded at will. With no indication as to the basis for 
the exercise of the power vested in the court to grant 
new trials the appeal tribunal would be left to analyze 
the matter from the evidence, the record and the in- .:;[-
structions. It would be required to search out 
possible reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the 
trial court in the exercise of a discretion. The ex-
ercise of a judicial discretion must be based upon ~~;m~ 
some facts, notwithstanding great latitude is ac-
corded the trial court in such matter." (Italics ours.) 
The specific facts indicated by the court as a basis for 
the exercise of its discretion in granting the motion for a ·'?..~ 
new trial are (1) that the caboose from which the decedent 
fell was being propelled ahead of the locomotive and of the 
train, thereby rendering such an accident as caused the 
death of the deceased possible, and (2) that the safety chain '':~:m 
mentioned in the evidence was inadequate, at least that 
when it was put to the test it failed to perform the function :,:mtnh 
for which it was intended. The court further stated in its 
decision, in effect, that these two important matters were 
uncontroverted in the evidence. The court must have also 
thought that the evidence was undisputed that these two i~iij 111t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
elements, separately or in combination, proximately con-
tributed to cause the accident and that the evidence was un-
disputed that they were a result of negligence on the de-
fendant's part, in order to exercise its discretion in the 
manner it did. We assert that the record amply discloses 
that such was not the case and that the trial court abused 
its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
We recognize that the burden is upon us to establish 
that the trial court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in 
the ruling it made and that the ruling of the trial court 
will be sustained unless such abuse of discretion is quite 
clearly shown. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 
-Utah-, 197 P. (2) 136. We recognize that this court 
can in law cases under its constitutional authority pass only 
upon law questions and that it can only pass upon the trial 
court's exercise of discretion as a matter of law. The trial 
court having granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial for 
insufficiency of the evidence, this court should examine the 
record for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
1 
trial court, as a matter of law, abused its discretion in hold-
ing the evidence insufficient to justify the verdict of the 
of the jury of "no cause of action" which it set aside. It 
· is not the result of the proceedings in the lower court which 
a this court must examine but the means whereby the lower 
~ 
· court in its discretion reached such result. 
j 
Returning to the reasons given by the trial court for the 
! granting of plaintiff's motion for a new trial we point out 
, that there never was any dispute but that the caboose was 
~ being shoved ahead of the engine. The court says this made 
~ the accident possible. It might just as well be said that if 
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the caboose was not being shoved ahead of the engine and 
if Jorgensen had not been riding the platform thereof and 
if he had not in some manner fallen therefrom the accident ;~!Dt 
would not have happened. In his reasoning the learned trial ::1~~1 
judge is talking about a condition; a condition that never was :::il: 
in dispute, the dispute, however, being as to whether shoving ;ll~~t 
the caboose ahead of the engine was negligence on the part of :~JJ.~1 
the defendant company proximately contributing to cause the ~wru 
accident. This proposition has often been discussed in negli-
gence cases and we think we need not elaborate on the dis- :,jit 
tinction between a condition and a causative contributing ::111~1 
factor, other than to say that a condition, which in the 
words of the court "rendered the accident possible," is not 
what the law predicates actionable negligence on. There must :ll~! 
be negligence. There must be a causal connection. Unless .:: r:: 
this is so the trial court should have directed a verdict for d~tnat 
the plaintiff simply because the caboose was being shoved ::~~! 
ahead of the engine and nothing more. It seems to us that .ii~ilil 
rejecting the jury's verdict for such reason is not the ex- 1~'!~ 
ercise of that sound, responsible judgment and judicial dis- :;tmr 
cretion which the court should exercise and which is the :,:m· l 
only kind of discretion the court is entitled to indulge. 
?:~in!J 
As to the court's observations with relation to the safety 
~:~~~! 
chain that the evidence was undisputed "that it was inade- :·:~~o: quate," "that it failed to perform the function for which it 
was intended when put to the test," the court is saying as a :~~)u~l 
matter of law that not only was the chain inadequate, which :ilm~1 we will solely for the sake of the argument concede the 
'il:iliat: 
court under the evidence had the power to say, but also that :\lt~] 
there was a causal connection between its condition and thf 
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accident; and the court further says that the evidence was 
undisputed, that is, as a matter of law, that the chain was 
"put to the test" and that it ''failed." There is no evidence 
in the record that the chain was "put to the test" except by 
an inference which the jury may have had power to draw 
but did not in this case see fit to draw. We think the trial 
court abused its discretion, in view of the record, to say that 
the jury was required to draw the inference the court draws 
and that it was the only inference that could be drawn. It 
is true that Wilson, the deceased's brother-in-law, brother 
of the widow, stated the chain could be dislodged by push-
ing on it from the top or striking it from the bottom, but 
the County Coroner, Williams, a disinterested witness who 
was investigating the accident in his official capacity in 
company with the Sheriff of the County and his deputy, 
testified that to disengage the chain it was necessary to take 
hold of the hook with the hand, raise it in a vertical position, 
and twist the hand slightly. The witness Croft testified to 
deceased's position on the caboose platform in detail except 
as to where his right hand was. In cases under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, at least, there can be no doubt 
but that a jury has the right to draw inferences whenever 
there is any reasonable basis in the evidence therefor. That 
means that they may draw inferences in like manner that 
do not impose liability upon defendant railroad companies 
as readily as inferences that do. This court is well acquainted 
with the slight amount of evidence which the Supreme Court 
; of the United States has said will support an inference that 
; imposes liability upon a defendant railroad company under 
- the Federal Employers' Liability Act and we think, and it 
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is a matter we propose to elaborate upon further, that this J~ 
legal proposition which has become so firmly established, of 
necessity permits the jury to draw inferences that do not 
impose liability as readily as inferences that do. The jury · 
could have as readily inferred from the evidence that 
Jorgensen was toying with the hook with his right hand, ·,mrt 
dislodged it, dropped it and fell when he reached for it, )~ 
as that he was thrown against the chain thus "putting it to i2;~el 
the test" and that it then "failed." There are other in-
ferences than that just mentioned possible in the light of ·31 
the evidence in this case that would not impose liability 
upon the defendant and which the jury may have drawn; 'ii[VJ 
as the only direct evidence as to what happened was that 
the safety chain was in place, that Jorgensen went through 3: 
the opening in the caboose railing, and that the safety chain :q.; ~ 
was hanging down afterwards. We think that the court :i:itiU 
here, and in combination with its consideration of the :;.~u~: 
matter of shoving the caboose ahead of the engine, invaded •i~ild 
the province of the jury, and that in substituting its own 
ideas as to what happened in place of the jury's finding ~1r4ID!· 
failed to exercise that sound, responsible judgment and 
judicial discretion required of it. We think the detailed and 
comprehensive statement of the evidence as set out in the i~]tijlv 
statement of facts as it pertains to the reasons given by the 
court in granting the motion for a new trial warrants the 
preceding assertion. 
The trial court, as recommended in the Saltas case, 
supra, has indicated and set forth the reasons for granting :~~~~~ 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, that is, has indicated the '·::ana 
basis for the exercise of its discretion. Because it is not !!~ol 
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the ultimate result reached by the trial court which primarily 
controls this court in determining the question now before 
it, but whether or not the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised, the specific reasons given by the trial 
court should largely engage the attention of this court. The 
trial court generalized when it stated that "there was no 
doubt a misapprehension or disregard on the part of the 
jury, either of the evidence, or the court's instructions, or 
of both," but it may be that this court should and will adopt 
the rule in examining the trial court's discretion that it will 
look only to the specific reasons given. Such procedure does 
not seem to us unreasonable nor does it seem unreasonable 
to require the trial court in granting or denying a motion 
for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of the evi-
dence to point out the insufficiency in detail. However, 
partly because this may be considered by the appellate court 
too narrow a view and unfair to the trial court and partly 
because we feel that the full significance of the part played 
by the chain and the shoving of the caboose ahead of the 
engine cannot be appreciated without examining the rest 
of the evidence in the case, we feel required to indulge 
briefly in a discussion of the evidence pertaining to the four 
issues involved. 
With respect to Issue No. I, the claim that defendant 
was negligent in requiring deceased to perform his duties 
from the platform of the caboose, there can be no doubt 
from the evidence that at the time and place in question it 
was proper for Jorgensen to be on the platform of the 
caboose and that this was the customary and usual place 
for the two brakemen to be stationed as the train proceeded 
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along the track on the Goshen Branch. It appears from the j!t 
evidence that there was no necessity for Jorgensen to place ~~ 
himself as he did immediately in front of the opening in ,::n 
the caboose platform. According to the evidence he could 
have performed his duties by standing any place on the plat-
form and, in fact, could have performed his duties by rid. ~ID 
ing inside the caboose and if the weather had been in- ,?!~a 
clement undoubtedly would have done so. There were win- .:r~f 
dows in the end walls of the caboose on both sides. He 
could have stationed himself to the rear of the platform .;l'it 
against the end wall of the caboose where he could have held .M~r 
on to a grabiron as the other brakeman, Croft, was doing at 
the time of the accident. There is very little evidence of 
any particular significance one way or the other under this 
issue as the undisputed evidence is that he was not in~ 
specting the train at the time of or immediately preceding 
the accident and that the only duty he had to perform was to 
ride and look forward and whistle as they approached 
crossings; that it was, in fact, not necessary for him to 
whistle as the engineer was at the time watching ahead 
and whistling for all crossings, and customarily did watch :lf!w~ 
out for all crossings and whistle for them. Moreover, the 
track was straight and the country was level. The engineer 
and the fireman, if he was doing his duty, which is presumed, iiitl1at! 
would be looking forward for any obstructions such as 
cattle in the right of way or cars that might be on any of 21·'~~~~ 
these country crossings. In short, whatever may have been ~~W~i 
the extent of his duties to be performed on the platform ~~ti 
of the caboose, he was at the time of the accident not per- ~~~ 
formin~ any duties at all that in any way entered into the ~~a 
·~ma 1 
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accident as a causative factor so far as the evidence shows, 
except perhaps his merely being on the platform, which in 
1 and by itself is wholly insufficient to predicate negligence 
upon. 
As to Issue No. II, that the defendant failed to furnish 
an adequate chain and hook across the opening in the end 
railing of the caboose, we see no reason for us to discuss 
this in detail in view of the fact that there is in evidence 
the very chain involved (Defendant's Ex. 1) and an iron 
eye (Defendant's Ex. 2) built to the same specifications as 
the iron eye which was attached to the caboose at the time 
of the accident. We do not think we can add anything to 
the examination the court can itself make of these exhibits 
when aided by the photographs of the caboose which are in 
evidence. 
With respect to Issue No. III, that the defendant was 
negligent in shoving the caboose ahead of the engine, the 
court is referred to the statement of facts wherein we set 
up the two rules that were involved and indicate the re-
spective theories which the plaintiff and the defendant had 
with respect to this element of the case. We think the evi-
dence clearly established the fact that the train was in 
"work train service." It was what is known as a "work 
extra," operating under "work train orders." Under Oper-
ating Rule 802 (J) of the defendant company this fact alone 
permitted the caboose to be shoved ahead of the locomotive. 
Under Rule 802 (J) it is also permissible to move a caboose 
ahead of a locomotive when it is necessary to take cars to 
or from a spur. Conductor Freeman testified that had it 
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not been for the accident he would have gone as far as the 
spur at Cox, which is a dead end track that can be entered 
only from the north end. This crew did not know when it 
left Idaho Falls whether or not it would have to take cars 
from certain spurs, such as Cox, as the evidence is there 
were no agents at these stations and the work orders they 
had on the day in question simply authorized them to do 
necessary switching between Idaho Falls and Goshen J unc-
tion. Quite obviously the intention of Freeman was to take 
from the spur at Cox any cars that were loaded and ready 
to be moved. Had he found a car or cars on the spur ready 
to be moved and had the caboose been behind the engine, one 
of two things would have been necessary, (1) either to drop 
the caboose in against the standing cars on the spur, which 
might not have been possible at all if the standing cars 
nearly filled the spur, or (2) to leave the caboose behind the 
engine ,reach in and get the cars, which would have resulted 
in shoving the caboose ahead of the engine as they left Cox 
and returned in a northerly direction. Freeman testified 
that Cox was as far as he intended to go on the day in ques-
tion. Rule 802· (J) does provide that a caboose even in 
"work train service" or where necessary "to take cars to 
or from a spur" shall not be shoved ahead of the engine for 
any greater distance than necessary. The evidence is that 
at best it would have been necessary to shove the caboose 
ahead of the engine to the first siding at Gerrard, which 
was one mile distant, had it been trailing at the point of 
the accident and later at Cox. In working on a branch line 
such as the Goshen Branch where cars may have to be 
placed to or taken from three different spurs this would be 
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a highly impractical operation and as all of the members of 
the crew indicate would involve a great deal of extra switch-
ing. Counsel for the plaintiff, of course, would make capital 
of the fact that after a fatal accident has occurred, the de-
fendant company is more interested in simplifying its 
operations than protecting the lives of its men, which we 
think is a specious argument that may appeal to juries, but 
ought not to appeal to either trial or appellate court judges. 
The prohibition in Rule 802 (J) against handling cars 
ahead of the engine implies that there is some danger at-
tendant thereto and that this is a fact we readily admit; but 
there are certain absolutely necessary and essential railroad 
operations where it is considered safer by the company to 
push a caboose ahead of the engine than to make what is 
known as a running switch or "drop" sometimes designated 
in railroad parlance as a "flying switch." As testified to 
by Conductor Freeman, Rule 802 (H) which provides that 
running switches or "drops" must not be made when prac-
ticable to avoid doing so, is in practical railroad operations 
understood by railroad men to mean that they shall not 
make drops except where absolutely necessary. It is true 
that plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified that a drop 
was not hazardous, although he also stated that he knew it 
was against the operating rules to make a drop unless 
absolutely necessary (R. 80). The operating rules of the 
company as well as the overwhelming weight of the testi-
mony as given by other witnesses clearly indicates that 
making a running switch or "drop" is a dangerous, hazardous 
operation. Throughout our experience with this lawsuit we 
have often thought how much better case the plaintiff would 
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have had and how much more plaintiff's counsel would have :~~ 
made of it if Jorgensen had been killed while the crew was 'j!!lli 
making a "drop." If Jorgensen had been killed while making !IIPl 
a "drop" it would have been impossible for the defendant to ;~ 1 
escape the charge that plaintiff's counsel would then make, :<~ 
viz, that the drop was unnecessary and could have been 
avoided by pushing the caboose ahead of the engine-the 1~ 
very thing the defendant was doing at the time of this :: .~ 
unfortunate accident. It may be helpful to the court, in so ~j~;~ea 
far as the testimony in the record permits, to make an ex- 11~ 
planation of the manner in which a drop or running switch iil~l 
is made. The witness Paul Croft testified as to how a drop ;~:( 
is made ( R. 81, 82), which testimony with all its necessary ~: fu 
implications show the operation to be performed in the :~~i 
following manner : When a locomotive has a car behind it ·~na 
which the crew desires to put in on a spur or dead end ~l): 
track and the spur takes off from the main track in such uri 
a manner that the car cannot be shoved into the spur, un- ~:,: 
coupled, and the engine backed out, it becomes necessary ;::1! 
to make a drop. Every member of the crew is required to ~~~ 
understand the movement that is to be made. The switches ~mi~ 
and the brakes to be used must be tested and a man must :~fu1 
ride the car which is to be dropped, if necessary, in order to ;i:!l! 
brake it to a stop on the spur. A man must always ride (J! 
either the car or the locomotive in order to pull the coupling ~1r 
pin at the exact moment necessary. As disclosed in Rule :1!
1 
802 (H) running switches are absolutely prohibited in some .~~ 
circumstances. The operation consists of lining the switch 1~n1 
for the main track when the locomotive is some distance ltar 
away; the locomotive then gets up considerable speed headed ·~~ 
•1a 
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for the switch ; just before it reaches the switch the engineer 
slows it down slightly permitting the slack to run in against 
the engine, which is necessary so that the trainman riding 
the car or the footboard of the engine will be able to pull 
the pin. The pin is pulled the moment the slack runs into 
the engine and the engine then speeds up and runs away from 
the free rolling car, across the switch and down the main 
line. As soon as the locomotive crosses the switch the man 
stationed at the switch throws it, thus diverting the free 
rolling and approaching car into the spur where it is braked 
to a stop by another trainman if that is necessary. When 
the switches, brakes, the locomotive and all the other equip-
ment function properly and the engineer and all the 
members of the crew succeed in attaining the precise 
coordination required, the drop is successfully made. It 
does not take one experienced in railroad operations to 
realize that there is danger in this operation owing to the 
speed at which it is necessary to make the same ; the fact 
that the car hits a curved track, that is, the spur, as soon 
as the switch is thrown, which may lead to derailment and 
the injury or killing of the man at the switch or on the car; 
and the fact that the man at the switch, unless he exercises 
extreme care, may throw the switch under the engine de-
railing it, or under the boxcar causing its derailment. 
Furthermore, if it should happen that the car dropped in 
on the spur does not clear the main line, the locomotive is 
blocked and cannot move on the main line without first 
backing up to the point where it corners with the standing 
boxcar and then chaining the boxcar and dragging it for-
ward onto the spur beyond the clearance point, which is in 
itself a dangerous operation. 
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We submit that practical railroad operations require 
and switching can not be performed without, in some in-
stances, either pushing a caboose ahead of a locomotive, or 
making a drop. Defendant company has fully recognized the 
danger incident to either operation. The men are all familiar 
with the dangers of such operation and the company has, 
so far as humanly possible, endeavored by the promulgation 
of the two operating rules, 802 (J) and 802 (H), to reduce 
to the absolute minimum the unavoidable and inescapable 
hazards involved in this class of necessary and essential 
railroad operation. Operating rules of a railroad company 
do not fix standards of due care but, as has been held many 
times, are evidence of what is due care under the circum-
stances. We think the rules here being discussed and the 
manner in which the operation was being performed at 
the time Jorgensen was killed reflect due care. The jury 
thought so too, when they returned their verdict which 
exculpated the defendant of any negligence contributing to 
the accident. We think it was an abuse of discretion, as a 
matter of law on the part of the court on this phase of the 
case to· reject the accumulated experience of railroad men as 
reflected in the rules, and the operation consistent there-
with, that was being had at the time of the accident, and 
to reject the jury's finding thereon, substituting its own 
idea that shoving the caboose ahead of the engine was negli-
gence, and holding that the evidence thereon was uncon-
tradicted, and further holding, as it must have, that there 
was a causal connection between this fact alone and the 
accident. 
As to Issue No. IV, which embraced the charge that 
the defendant was negligent owing to the construction of 
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the caboose in combination with the condition of the track 
at and near the scene of the accident, we take the liberty 
of referring the court to the detailed statement of the evi-
dence set out in the statement of facts. It is a purely 
factual situation in which we think we can be of little 
assistance to the court in their consideration of the evidence, 
which we suggest should include an examination of the 
moving pictures and the still pictures in connection there-
with which are in evidence. 
From our examination of the previous decisions of this 
court on the question here involved, it is apparent that each 
case must be disposed of upon its own particular facts in 
accordance with those principles of law which have thus 
far been established in this jurisdiction. A brief reference 
to some of the previously adjudicated cases seems called for. 
The latest case which contained any extended discussion 
on the principle of law involved was the case of Moser v. 
Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst.,- Utah-, 197 P. (2) 136, 
in which Mr. Justice Wolfe reviewed most of the early Utah 
cases treating the subject. This case was later followed in 
State v. Cooper,- Utah-, 201 P. (2) 764, without ad-
ditional discussion of the question. In the Moser case Mr. 
Justice Wolfe said: 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of 
any serious dispute that the question of granting or 
denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. White v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; 
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 
P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69 
Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown Live Stock 
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Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan City, 
89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies whether 
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evi-
dence or upon newly discovered evidence. See cases 
above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 
55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 
255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and Trimble v. Union Pacific 
Stages, 105 Utah 4'57, 142 P. 2d 674. This court 
cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial 
court. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 
2 N. G. C. A. 782. We do not ordinarily interfere 
with rulings of the trial court in either granting or 
denying a motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, 
or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the 
trial judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the 
trial judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. 
Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union 
Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State Bank v. Living-
ston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 73 
Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble v. Union Pacific 
Stages, supra. See also Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. 
Co., 116 Gal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 1020." 
The quotations from ·Mr. Justice Wolfe are supported by 
the Utah decisions which he has cited and we have no quarrel 
whatever with the principles collated and announced in the 
Moser case. And as stated at the outset, we recognize further 
that the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the 
trial court, which is another way of saying that the appellate 
court is concerned with a question of law, and recognize that 
the burden is upon the defendant in this case to show the 
abuse of discretion charged. We concede that "the question 
of granting or denying a motion for a new trial is a matter 
largely within the discretion of the trial court," but we are 
not prepared to admit that, as seems to be indicated in a few 
re 
Wi 
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of the earlier Utah cases, the appellate court in any case 
where it has, for instance, affirmed the trial court in deny-
ing a motion for a new trial where the grounds urged were 
insufficiency of the evidence, would have in the same in-
stance affirmed the trial court had the trial court granted 
the motion. We think this is suggested in what Mr. Justice 
Wolfe says further in the Moser case: 
"The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down 
by this court is that where a motion for a new trial 
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict, the trial court will not be held to 
have abused its discretion in denying the motion 
unless there is no substantial evidence in the record 
to support the verdict. United States v. Brown, 6 
Utah 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 
414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. Therefore, if 
reasonable minds could have found as the jury did 
in this case, from the evidence before it (the verdict 
was for the plaintiff and the trial court denied the 
motion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency 
of evidence) , then we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's (sic) 
motion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict." (Italics ours.) 
And further: 
"The determination of this ultimate fact (which 
of the two drivers was across the center line of the 
highway) was for the jury. And the jury having 
determined this question in plaintiff's favor and 
the trial court having denied defendants' motion for 
a new trial, this court cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion unless there was no substantial 
evidence to support the verdict, or in other words, 
that all reasonable minds must agree that it was 
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the plaintiff, and not defendant Rogers, who tram-
gressed the center line of the highway." 
The court concluded that there was substantial evidence 
to support the verdict of the jury and that the trial court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion for a new trial based upon insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict. We think that it follows, not 
necessarily perhaps in every case but in most all cases, that 
the trial court should be held to have abused its discretion 
when it grants a motion for a new trial in the face of evidence 
which amply supports the jury's verdict. 
In the case of James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. ' 
1068, 2 N . .C. C. A. 782, Mr. Justice Straup said in a separate 
concurring opinion : 
"Whatever legal discretion may rightfully be 
exercised by the trial court in passing on motions for 
a new trial, I think it is clear that when the evidence, 
both in point of law and of fact, is sufficient to justify 
the verdict, and the trial court is satisfied of such 
sufficiency, he may not then, in his discretion, set it 
aside on the sole ground that, had he tried the case 
on the facts, he would have reached a different con-
clusion. To hold otherwise is to hold that the court 
in its discretion may invade the duty to decide by 
setting aside verdicts until he has found a jury to 
agree with him." 
It seems to us that the preservation of the right to trial 
by jury requires the trial court in most cases to recognize 
and uphold the verdict of a jury when that verdict is sup-
ported by substantial, competent evidence even though the 
record is such that the jury may well have found otherwise. 
~'t!ld 
lnl 
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Certainly the discretion the trial court is permitted to in-
dulge is not a whim or a personal dissatisfaction with the 
result. The James case, supra, was one wherein the verdict 
was for the plaintiff and defendant's motion for a new trial 
was denied and such action was affirmed by this court, the 
court using the following language in the main opinion : 
"In cases like the one before us, where all other 
assignments fail, the only available assignment is 
that the evidence does not justify the v~rdict of the 
jury, and where the trial court has refused to grant 
a new trial, all that we are authorized to do is to 
look into the evidence to ascertain whether there is 
any substantial evidence in support of every material 
element which plaintiff is required to establish in 
order to recover. If there is such evidence, then, so 
far as we are concerned, the verdict must stand, al-
though in our judgment, if we passed on the facts, 
the verdict upon the whole evidence should have been 
to the contrary." 
By this same process of reasoning it seems to us to 
follow that where, as in the instant case, abuse of discretion 
is charged as a result of the court's granting a motion for a 
new trial because of insufficiency of the evidence, the court 
should be held to have abused its discretion unless from the 
record it appears that the evidence either failed to support 
the jury's verdict or was of such questionable character as 
entitled the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discre-
tion to say that the verdict was not so supported. 
In White v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., an early case re-
ported in 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030, the Supreme -court affirmed 
the trial court in granting the defendant's motion for a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
new trial in a case where the evidence seemed to be fairly 
evenly balanced. While such a result might be properly 
reached by an appellate court in some cases, we do not admit 
that the rule is that upon substantially conflicting evidence 
the court in every case or in most cases, should be upheld in 
granting a motion for a new trial. 
The language in the case of Utah State Bank v. Living-
ston, 69 Utah 284, 2'54 P. 781, indicates that this court then 
took the view that where the evidence was substantially 
conflicting the appellate court must hold as a matter of 
law that no abuse of discretion is shown whether the motion 
for a new trial had been either granted or denied. Possibly 
no such holding was intended by the decision in this case, 
but if it was, we submit that it was wrong and that if such 
principle has become fixed in Utah law we suggest that it 
now be re-examined by this court. We might add in passing 
that the Utah State Bank case was a case wherein the de-
fendant recovered a verdict which was set aside on plain-
tiff's motion on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, 
and the case cited in support of the general statement made 
in the opinion was the case of Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining 
Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802, which was a case where de-
fendant's motion for a new trial, after a verdict for the 
plaintiff was denied, this court holding that the court did 
not abuse its discretion for the reason that there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the plaintiff's verdict. 
A good general statement is set forth in 39 Am. Jur., 
New Trial, Sec. 134, p. 143, as follows: 
"As a general rule, where the evidence appears 
to be conflicting, a verdict will not be set aside un-
rni 
. :ll~li 
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less it is clearly and palpably against the weight of 
the evidence or unless, as a matter of law, the con-
clusion could not have been reasonably reached by 
reasonable minds. In case of conflicting testimony, 
the court proceeds upon the theory that the jury had 
a right to accept all the testimony of the successful 
side as true and reject that of the other side as un-
true, mistaken or unsatisfactory, unless the test-
imony, including the circumstances and probabilities, 
reveals a situation that proves the testimony of the 
successful side to be inherently wrong. It cannot be 
said· that the denial of a motion for a new trial on 
the ground that the verdict is against the law and 
the evidence is wrong where the evidence was strong-
ly conflicting on several controlling points and its 
weight depended in no small manner on the credi-
bility of the witnesses." 
This, we contend, should be the guide to a trial court 
in exercising its discretion and a departure therefrom should 
be considered an abuse of discretion. No better reason could 
be given for the denial of a motion for a new trial on the 
grounds of insufficiency of the evidence than that the evi-
dence was substantially conflicting and entitled the jury to 
find either way, but it does not follow that in every case, 
or even in most cases, a court is acting within its discretion 
in granting a motion for a new trial where there is sub-
stantially conflicting evidence such as would readily justify 
the jury in returning a verdict for either side. 
In the instant case we insist that the evidence amply 
justified the jury in returning a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant "no cause of action." The proper exercise of a trial 
court's discretion should not go to the extent of permitting 
the court to upset a jury's verdict which is amply supported 
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by the evidence, and to continue to do so until the jury 
finally returns a verdict to the court's liking. This is what 
Mr. Justice Straup was condemning in the Robertson case, 
supra, when he said, "To hold otherwise is to hold that the 
court in its discretion may invade the duty to decide by 
setting aside verdicts until he has found a jury to agree 
with him." 
Each case presenting the question here involved must 
to a large extent rest upon its own particular facts. This 
becomes readily apparent from an examination of the Utah 
cases. In the V aliotis case, supra, the court said : 
"* * * The trial judge ought not, as a gen-
eral rule, to disturb the verdict if in his opinion there 
is substantial evidence to support it. 'To set aside 
the verdict in such cases would be to invade the 
province of the jury in whom is vested the power 
to decide all questions of fact and to whom all evi-
dence thereon is to be addressed." 
The court quoted the following rule with approval from 
20 R. C. L. 277 : 
"As the jury is the exclusive judge of the evi-
dence, it must in reason be the exclusive judge of 
what constitutes the preponderance of the evidence, 
and, when that judgment is reached upon evidence 
sufficient to support a verdict, it should not be dis-
turbed by the court." 
We respectively submit that the lower court abused its 
discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial and 
in holding, in the words of Section 104-40-7, U. C. A. 1943, 
that there had been "such a plain disregard by the jury of 
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~ · the instructions or the evidence, or both, * * * as to 
~~ satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under a mis-
11i; apprehension of such instructions, or under the influence 
----· of passion and prejudice." In the exercise of sound judicial 
~::: discretion the court should not have been so satisfied to the 
,! extent required in Section 104-40-7. The reasons given by 
the court in its written decision granting the motion for a 
new trial (R. 179, 180), and as set out and discussed above, 
··.;. 
seem to us to conclusively establish the fact that the trial 
court was not indulging its discretion as it should. 
We have thus far refrained from considering the signifi-
cance of the fact, as it relates to the sole assignment of error 
,.. herein made, that this is a case under the Federal Employers' 
~: Liability Act. Since the amendment of 1939 to the Federal 
1:: Employers' Liability Act, the bar and the bench, under the 
'1.~ 
:~ compulsion of the Supreme Court of the United States and 
as a result of their exercise of an unquestioned prerogative, 
have been forced to a radical revision of their long held 
-- understanding and application of the rules dealing with 
directed verdicts in connection with cases tried under the 
act. We now urge upon this court the proposition that in 
,::; F. E. L. A. cases the restrictions placed upon trial courts 
:: in the matter of directing verdicts by ·the Supreme Court of 
f; the United States affects, controls and curtails the right of 
~ :r 
trial courts to exercise as fully the discretion to grant new 
trials for insufficiency of the evidence as they have here-
:~~ tofore been considered to possess. Let us concede that the 
~; court in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict never 
had and does not have any discretion, and in passing upon 
· a motion for a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence 
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has always had and still has some discretion to exercise. How 
much discretion, however, is left to the trial court in grant-
ing or denying a motion for a new trial in F. E. L.A. cases? 
Do the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
permit a trial court, state or federal, while following the 
concepts laid down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States relative to directing verdicts, to "exercise its discre-
tion" in setting aside the jury's verdict if the same is sup-
ported by any substantial evidence? Can the trial court ac-
complish by indirection what, in fact, amounts to a nullifica-
tion of the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in F. E. L. A. cases by setting aside jury verdicts 
where there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the same? Would the Supreme Court of the United States 
tolerate a trial court's setting aside a verdict for an employe 
for insufficiency of evidence in any case where the evidence 
was such as impelled a submission of the case to the jury 
in the first instance? In rare cases possibly so, but we be-
lieve that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States by necessary implication absolutely prohibit the 
application of state practice and procedure so as to curtail 
the substantive rights of the employe under the F. E. L.A., 
whether such application is made at the time a motion for 
a directed verdict is presented or subsequently upon applica-
tion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 
Employment plus injury, under the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, means an F. E. L. A. case al-
most invariably is· submitted to the jury; so much so, in 
fact, that at least one Justice has accused that court of 
rendering "lip service" to the proposition that "negligence 
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must still be shown." In Wilkerson v.· McCa't'thy, 336 U. 
;: S. 53, Mr. Justice Jackson said : 
''* * * In this opinion the court continues 
to pay lip service to the doctrine that liability in these 
cases is to be based only upon fault." 
But we wish to point out that this was said in a dissent. 
In Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion, separately concurring with 
~ the main opinion in the case, he said : 
"The criterion governing the exercise of our 
discretion in granting or denying certiorari is not 
who loses below but whether the jury function in 
passing upon disputed questions of fact and in draw-
ing inferences from proven facts has been respected. 
The historic role of the jury in performing that func..: 
tion * * * is being restored in this important 
class of cases." (Italics ours.) 
We realize the court was talking about the power of a 
__ trial court to direct a verdict, as it is in some but not all of 
.~ the quotations which will be hereinafter made, but it is our 
_ position that this emphasis on respecting the power of the 
_ jury to determine disputed questions of fact and drawing 
inferences from proven facts necessarily goes to the extent 
.- of pervading and curtailing to considerable extent the theory 
that trial courts may grant new trials for insufficiency of 
....... 
:·~ the evidence. If this is the case, it is of course binding upon 
:: all state courts, and will compel this court to re-examine its 
.~ previous pronouncements upon the power of trial courts to 
. . grant new trials "in their discretion" for insufficiency of 
.. the evidence. State courts are governed in their construc-
f~f tion, application and interpretation of the F. E. L. A. by 
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the decisional law of the federal courts. Klinge v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. (2) 367. 
We think the fact is sometimes lost sight of that if a 
jury is permitted to draw inferences whenever, as the 
Supreme Court has said, there is any "reasonable" basis in 
the evidence therefore, so as to impose liability upon the de-
fendant railroad company, they are equally entitled to draw 
such inferences when they do not impose liability. We think 
not even the Supreme Court of the United States can apply 
one rule where an employe prevails and apply another where 
the defendant railroad company has prevailed. And if, as 
their decisions clearly indicate, they would not tolerate a 
trial judge upsetting a jury's verdict in favor of an employe 
where there was any reasonable basis in the evidence there-
for, they cannot consistently tolerate such ruling on the part 
of a trial court where the verdict has been in favor of the 
defendant railroad company and there was a reasonable basis 
in the evidence therefor. 
We would like to quote briefly from some of the cases 
that have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States during the recent development just referred to. In 
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 3.21 U.S. 29, 88 L. Ed. 520, 
64 Sup. Ct. 409, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal~ con-
sidered the evidence which led to a verdict for the~~:~ 
in the District Court, and while conceding the negligence, 
reversed upon the ground that they considered there was no 
causal connection between such negligence and the accident. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and, 
among other things, said : 
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"No court is then justified in substituting its 
conclusions for those of the twelve jurors. 
* * * * * 
"It is not the function of a court to search the 
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence nor 
to take the case away from the jury on the theory that 
the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and 
uncertain inferences. 
* * * * * 
"Courts are not free to re-weigh the evidence 
and set aside the jury verdict merely because the 
·. jury could have drawn different inferences or con-
clusions or because judges feel that other results are 
more reasoruible." 
~ This is what the Supreme Court of the United States had 
:: to say about the Seventh 'Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
was doing in an F. E. L. A. case exactly what the honor-
able trial court did in the case before this court. They had 
this further to say : 
"Thus to enter a judgment for respondent Doth-
withstanding the verdict is to deprive petitioner of 
the right to a jury trial. No reason is apparent why 
we should abdicate our duty to protect and guard 
that right in this case." 
This, we say, affords unquestioned support to the con· 
, tention we herein make, viz, that the Supreme Court of the 
~, United States will not tolerate trial judges disturbing the 
~ jury's verdict whenever there is any reasonable basis in 
"' the evidence for the verdict, any more than they now tolerate 
'
11 directed verdicts. 
In Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 90 L. Ed. 916, 66 
Sup. Ct. 7 40, it was held that whenever there was ever any 
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evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict the function of an 
appellate court was exhausted. The court said: 
"It would be an undue invasion of the jury's 
historic function for an appellate court to weigh the 
conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of wit-
nesses, and arrive at a conclusion opposite from the 
one reached by the jury. * * * Where there is 
an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury 
is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are in-
consistent with its conclusion. * * * It being 
immaterial that the court might draw a contrary in-
ference or feel that another conclusion is more rea-
sonable." 
In Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 91 L. 
Ed. 572, 67 Sup. Ct. 598, it was said : 
''The choice of conflicting versions of the way 
the accident happened, the decision as to which wit-
ness was telling the truth, the inferences to be drawn 
-from uncontroverted as well as controverted facts, 
are questions for the jury. Once there is a reasonable 
basis in the record for concluding that there was 
negligence which caused the injury, it is irrelevant 
that fair minded men might reach a different con-
clusion. For then it would be an invasion of the 
'jury's function for an appellate court to draw con-
trary inferences or to conclude that a different con-
clusion would be more reasonable." 
In Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520, where 
this court reviewed the evidence and held, as a matter of 
law, that the defective equipment complained of did not 
proximately cause or contribute to decedent's death and 
sustained the trial court in granting a directed verdict, the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed and reiterated 
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the principles set forth above, and referred to the discus-
sion by this court as an indulgence in "dialectical subtleties" 
which served no useful interpretative purpose of the meaning 
, of the F. E. L. A. From this we conclude the Supreme Court 
I· of the United States is determined that the jury shall de-
': termine questions of fact in F. E. L. A. cases and that 
~ 
neither trial nor appellate courts shall turn their training 
~' 
-:.: 
and experience to a consideration of the facts. 
In Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 
87 L. Ed. 1444, 63 Sup. Ct. 1062, the Supreme Court said: 
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and funda-
mental feature of our system of federal jurispru-
dence.' Jacobs v. New York City, 315 U. S. 372. It 
is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad 
workers under the Employers Liability Act. Reason-
able care and cause and effect are as elusive here 
as in other fields. But the jury has been chosen as 
the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards 
to the facts of these personal injuries. That method 
of determining the liability of the carriers and of 
placing on them the cost of these industrial accidents 
may be crude, archaic, and expensive as compared 
with the more modern systems of workmen's com-
pensation. But however inefficient and backward it 
may be, it is the system which Congress has provided. 
To deprive these workers of the benefit of a jury 
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a 
goodly portion of the relief which Congress has af-
forded them." 
Again we say that we are not unaware of the fact 
that the quotations herein set out were made in connec-
tion with a consideration of trial courts directing verdicts 
~· and appellate courts sustaining them in such action or 
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the evidence and were not made in connection with a situa-
tion where a trial judge upsets a jury's verdict because "in 
his discretion" he is dissatisfied with the sufficiency of the 
evidence. That the whole problem is a federal question can-
not be doubted. That the determination of the Supreme 
Court of the United States to make certain that the verdicts 
of juries in F. E. L.A. cases shall not be disturbed by courts 
under any device, pretext or application of any state rule 
or principle of practice and procedure is made abundantly 
clear in the above decisions. That neither trial nor appellate 
courts can weigh the evidence, draw inferences from con-
flicting evidence, and decide the facts, but that this is the 
exclusive prerogative of the jury, is the clear and unmis-
takable intent of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
interpreting the legislation Congress saw fit to enact with 
the F. E. L. A. A rule of practice and procedure, together 
with the interpretation and construction that may be placed 
thereon by a state court, which defeats the "administration" 
of the F. E. L.A. as the Supreme Court of the United States 
has said it shall be administered, ought not to be any longer 
maintained by this court. Due regard for the exclusive 
right of the United States Supreme Court to determine how 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act shall be "administered" 
and to pass final judgment on this exclusively federal ques-
tion compels all state courts, it seems to us, to sweep away 
any and all rules of practice and procedure that in any way 
and in any degree curtail the substantive rights of the 
parties under the F. E. L. A. as declared by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
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~ To summarize our contentions we assert first, that the 
:~ trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiff's 
!;! motion for a new trial and that this is so even though the 
problem be examined without any consideration whatever 
..: of the fact that the instant case is one brought under the 
,.., Federal Employers' Liability Act; and secondly, that the 
case being one brought under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act, the trial court does not have that "discretion" in 
granting a motion for a new trial for insufficiency of the 
evidence, where their is any substantial evidence to support 
_ the verdict, that it has heretofore under the statutes and 
... decisions of this court been considered to have, in cases not 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and 
_ _ we respectfully submit that this case should be remanded 
to the trial court with directions to reinstate the verdict 
of the jury of "no cause of action." 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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